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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\\ralker Bank & Trust Company, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent~ 
v. 
Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Commissioner 
of the State of Utah, and State Bank 
of Provo, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
No. 
9947 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
Defendants-appellants respectfully move the court, 
pursuant to Rule 76 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to reconsider its opinion in this case, grant 
a rehearing, and, upon said reconsideration and rehear-
ing, to vacate its prior decision, reverse the judgment 
of the District Court of Salt Lake County, and remit 
the case with directions to dismiss the action with preju-
dice. 
The decision should be reconsidered and a rehearing 
granted for the following reasons: 
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1. In construing the language of 7-3:.6 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, the court overlooked the rule of statu-
tory construction prescribed in 68-3-6 Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953. 
2. The spirit of the statute should prevail over its 
letter whether or not the letter .leads to an "absurd" 
result. 
3. Applying the holding of the court to specific 
fact situations will lead to absurd results. 
;4. The result reached by the court raises serious 
questions as to the constitutionalitv of the branch bank-
ing statute under .both the State" and Federal Consti-
tutions. 
A. r.ratt Kesler 
Atto!ney Gen~ral 
H. Wright Volker 
Respectfully submitted, 
Peter W. Billings 
Bryce E. Roe 
Fabian & Clendenin 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
State Bank of Provo 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Spencer C. Taylor 
Bank Commissioner 
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BltlEF 0~, DEFENDANTS-APPELLI-\NTS 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This was a declaratory judgment action brought 
by \ V alker Bank and Trust Company for construction 
of 7-3-6 Utah Code Annotated 1953, particularly inso-
far as it governs establishment of branch banks in 
cities and towns other than Salt Lake City. The trial 
court and this court held that 7-3-6 Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953 prohibits a unit bank in such a city from 
having a branch in the city in which it is located, even 
though there may be no other banks or branches there, 
and even though the Bank Commissioner has found 
that "the public convenience and advantage will be 
subserved by such a branch." 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
IN CONSTRUING THE LANGUAGE OF 
7-3-6 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 THE 
COURT OVERLOOKED THE RULE OF 
STr\TUTORY CONSTRUCTION PRE-
SCRIBED IN 68-3-6 UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED 1953. 
In its decision this court looked generally at the 
history of branch banking, noting that it had been pro-
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hibited by UtahJaw betw.een 1911 and 1933, but failed 
to anal~ze; the meaning of 7-3-6 as of its first enact-
ment (Chapter 6, Laws of Utah 1933); and a construc-
tion of the original statute was necessary because the 
pertinent part 'of present 7-3-6 Utah Code Annotated 
~95§ C()ntain~ language identical with that in the original 
a~t. J:"'he, ~o~rt is required therefore, to apply 68-3-6 
Utah ,Code _Annot~ted · 1953: _ 
''The provisions of any statute, so far as they 
are the. same .as those of any prior statute, shall 
be cons~rued_as a continuation of such provisions, 
and not as a new enactment." 
The -7-3-6 enacted by Chapter 6, -Laws of Utah 
1933, contained the following language: 
· · " * * * No branch bank shall be established in 
any city, town or village in which _is located a 
bank or banks~ state or national, regularly trans-
acting a customary banking business unless the 
bank seeking to establish such branch shall take 
over an existing bank or obtain the consent of all 
banks therein located_, except that in cities of the 
first class branS!hes may be established without 
such consent; * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
~ .. ··The 1933 Legislature could not have meant that 
a·· unit ·batik l6cated in a second or third ·class city in 
-\Vhich it was the bnly banking facility could not establish 
a· br:incn bank there, for all the bank would have had 
to do was obtain its own consent-a senseless formality. 
It follows that under the 1933 statute (before the con-
sent pr9vision was declared unconstitutional in Union 
Trust Company. v. Simmons_, 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 
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190) a unit bank in a second or third class city was 
authorized to establish a branch in that city. The phrase 
"in which is located a bank or banks" could only have 
referred to "a bank or banks" other than the applying 
bank. 
The pertinent provisions of 7-3-6 Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, presently before the court, are as follows: 
"Except in cities of the first class, no branch 
bank shall be established in any city, town or 
village in 'which is located a bank or banks~ state 
· or national, regularly transacting a customary 
banking business, unless the bank seeking to 
establish such branch shall take over an existing 
bank~· * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
The emphasized language is identical with the 
language in the 1933 version of 7-3-6. Indeed, except 
for deletion of the unconstitutional consent, the entire 
prov1s1on IS substantially the same as the original en-
actment. 
Inasmuch as the legislature in 68-3-6 specifically 
declared its intention to be that identical language will 
will be deemed to be a continuation of the previous lan-
guage and not a new enactment, the. present 7-3-6 
must not be construed to prohibit a unit bank fron1 
establishing a branch in its own community unless there 
is another unit bank there-the kind of bank fron1 which 
the tmconstitutional consent once was to be sought. 
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II. 
THE SPIRIT OF THE STATUTE SHOULD 
PREVAIL OVER THE LETTER WHETHER 
OR NOT THE LETTER LEADS TO AN "AB-
SURD'' RESULT. 
Perhaps defendants-appellants were over-zealous 
in emphasizing the idea of "absurdity" while advancing 
their construction of 7-3-6; and this advocacy may have 
diverted the court's attention from its own decisions 
that the spirit o£ the statute prevails over the letter even 
though the letter might not lead to an "absurdity." 
In Norville v. State Tax Commission~ 98 Utah 
170, 97 P.2d 937, the court quoted with approval the 
following statement from Sutherland on Statutory Con-
struction~ §241, page 320: · 
"In the exposition of a statute the intention 
of the law-maker will prevail over the literal 
sense of the terms ; arid its reason and intention 
will prevail over the strict letter. When the words 
·are not explicit the intention is to be collected 
from the context; from the occasion and necessity 
of the law; from the mischief felt, and the remedy 
in view; and the 'intention is to be taken or pre-
sumed according to what is consonant with reason 
and good discretion." 
And the following from Ozawa v. United States, 260 
U.S. 178, 43 Sup. Ct. 65, 67 L. Ed. 199: 
"We may then look to the reason of the enact-
ment and inquire into its antecedent historv and 
give its effect in accordance with its desig~ and 
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purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal Inean~ 
ing in order that the purpose may not fail." 
The court not only approved the proposition that 
words tnay be 1nodified, altered, or supplied, but did in 
faet supply words to give effect to the legislative inten-
tion. 
In Rowley v. Pu,blic Service Commission, 112 Utah 
116, 185 P.2d 514, the court refused to adopt a literal 
interpretation of a statute because it refused to believe 
that the legislature intended to accomplish "an un-
reasonable if not absurd result." 
'roday's courts, says Sutherland In his work on 
statutory construction ( 2 Sutherland Statutory Con-
stnwtion [3rd Ed.) §4702) usually consider the legis-
latiYe purpose "from the start," rather than "beginning 
their inquiry with the formal words of the act." He 
ppints out that: 
"The literal interpretation of the words of an 
act should not prevail if it creates a result con-
trary to the apparent intention of the legislature 
and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit 
of a construction which will effectuate the legis-
lative intent. The intention prevails over the 
letter, and the letter must if possible be read 
so as to conform to the spirit of the act.'' (Id., 
§4706.) 
1. Quaere, whether the letter requires the result even if the 
letter is followed. In the phrase "in which is located a bank or 
banks," it is not clear whether "a" means "any," "all" or "an-
other." The article "a" is a word of uncertain reference. 1 Words 
and Phrases (Perm. Ed.) 4 & 5. Likewise, "any." Kountzer v. 
City of Omaha, 88 N.W. 117, 118. 63 Neb. 52. The significance 
of the words must be found in their context. cf. Benat v. Mutual 
Benefit Health & Accident Association, 191 Pa. Super. 97, 159 
A.2d 23, 25. 
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We also submit that . the court was incorrect in 
stating that what the statute doesn't permit it prohibits. 
The second _pa:r:agraph of 7-3-6 contains the following 
language: 
"With the consent of the bank commissioner 
=., and the approval of the governor, any bank hav-
" ing a_ .paid-in capital and .surplus of not less than 
$60,000~00 may establish a~d operate one branch 
for the transaction of its business within this 
state; .provided, that for each additional branch 
established there shall· be in an additional $60,-
000.00 (capital artd· surplus)." 
The later language limiting establishment of 
branch~:!B is a proviso which takes. away from the bank 
co~missioner some of the authority granted by the above 
quot.ed paragraph. And, as said in Dunn. v. Bryan~ 71 
Utah 604, 299 Pac. 255: 
"A proviso which operates to limit the appli-
c:!ation of the provisions of a statute, general in 
.. their terms, should be stri~tly construed to in-
clude no Gase not .within the l~tter of the proviso." 
.The court poirtted·out that a statute must be con-
s~ide:r;ed_with reference to the object sought to be accom-
.plisbed by it, and that a proviso should not be so con-
strued so as to destroy the general language. 
The object of the statute as enacted in Chapter 6, 
·Law of Utah 1933, was to grant banks in Utah the 
right to establish branches, but with a limitation upon 
the right of unit banks to establishing branches in areas 
in which other unit banks were located: The consent of 
10 
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ally other local unit bank had to be obtained. The statute 
was not intended to prohibit branches outside Salt Lake 
County except where they would infringe upon the 
territory or draw from the customers of existing unit 
banks. 
The statute expressly grants to banks with the 
requisite capital the right to operate branches, and the 
proviso should not be construed to take that right away 
from every unit bank located outside Salt Lake County. 
III. 
APPLYING THE HOLDING OF THE 
COURT TO SPECIFIC FACT SITUATIONS 
"\VILL LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS. 
In its opinion the court pointed out that since the 
leg·isla ture has the power to prohibit branch banking, 
it is not absurd for it to put restrictions upon • branch 
banking. We agree. What is' absurd (or at least ''un~ 
reasonable") is an interpretation under which like 
things are treated differently, and in which the distinc-
tions in application of the statute have no relationship 
to what the legislature obviously was attempting to 
accomplish. 
The means adopted by the legislature to restrict 
some branch, banking must have some relation to a 
legitimate legislative purpose; and in the instant case 
the court sees a legitimate purpose in restricting 
branches because unrestricted establishment of branches 
11 
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!linight impair the stability of existing ba~ks." But the 
manner in which 7-3-6 would operate as interpreted by 
the court has no rational relationship to the above (or 
any conceivable) legislative purpose. 
The decision does not affect the ability of State 
Bank of Provo to have branches, to over-extend itself, 
to engage in harmful competition, or to move toward 
monopoly, so long as it branches abroad rather than 
at home. It would be possible for the State Bank of 
Provo to obtain branches in Heber and Tooele-both 
on the. periphery of the Provo trading area- because 
n.either of these cities has a unit bank (though both have 
branch banks). But the court holds the State Bank of 
Provo cannot have a branch in Provo because the State 
Bank, itself, is already there, notwithstanding its pres-
ence has no relationship to the stability of any other 
unit bank in Provo; and the effect of branching on its 
own .operations and stability would depend on other 
factors than whether the branches were within or with-
out its home city. 
Establishment of any branch in Provo by any bank 
is now prohibited; but if an outside bank· were to 
acquire the State Bank of Provo and make a branch 
of it, the acquiring bank could establish another branch 
or other branches in Provo, provided only that the bank 
commissioner were to make the appropriate findings. 
But the stability of banks, the healthiness or unhealthi-
ness of competition, and the trend toward monopoly 
would be the ·same whether a local unit bank branches 
or a branch branches. 
12 
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Under the decision of the court son1e localities will 
he virtually prohibited from obtaining adequate banking 
services because the decision freezes the status quo. 
The single unit bank must continue to exist alone. No 
further services can be provided unless a new unit bank 
is approved and the necessary capital can be raised. 
lJ nder the decision-as shown by developments in 
Layton since argument of this case-a local bank cannot 
protect its competitive position by branching to tneet 
the increased need for services. In that growing commu-
nity the Cotnptroller of the Currency approved two new 
branches for a national bank and eliminated the need 
for a new unit bank; but under this court's reading of' 
section 7-3-6, the branches will now be illegal, and 
the existing Layton bank will be unable to grow with its 
own community. It will have to grow elsewhere. 
The Layton situation brings into focus another 
factor under the court's reading of the statute which 
will tend to "impair the stability of existing banks"--
a result directly contrary to the legislative purpose 
assigned to the statute by this court's decision. 
If an existing local bank cannot provide additional 
services to its community through the medium of a 
branch because it is already there, the only solution to 
the need for additional banking services is the chartering 
of new unit banks. The Comptroller of the Currency 
has been quick to exploit this. situation. The press is 
filled with comments on his liberality in granting new 
national bank charters throughout the country. In this 
13 
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state alone since 1962, he has granted seven new bank 
charters in Moab, Provo, Draper, Salt Lake City, Sugar 
House, Bountiful and Murray. These new unit banks 
are under no state regulation and are exempt from all 
state and local taxation other than the 4 per cent income 
tax imposed by Section 59-13-2 U.C.A. 1953 under the 
authority of Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the 
United States. 
It takes no specialized knowledge of the economics 
of banking to discern that the financial stability of two 
s1nall unit banks competing for business in one small 
town is much less than that of one unit bank with a 
supplementary branch in that same small town. This 
court's ruling opens the door to economic attrition of 
the state banking system from wide-open chartering of 
national banks.2 
IV. 
THERESULTREACHEDBYTHECOURT 
RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS AS TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BRANCH 
BAN·KING STATUTE UNDER BOTH THE 
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
2. And perhaps to wide-open branching of previously chartered 
national banks. In a newspaper article published since the court's 
decision in this case, reporting an application by Utah National 
Bank of Provo for approval of a BYU branch the national bank's 
attorney is quoted as saying that the national bank was probably 
the .only institution in Provo that could operate a branch on the 
Y campus, in view of the holding of this court (Salt Lake Tribune 
April 9, 1964, page B-9, column 1). ' 
14 
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The provisiOns of 7-3-6 Utah Code Annotated 
195:;, as interpreted in the court's opinion, permit unit 
banks in Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County to have 
"local" branches but do not permit unit banks in other 
cities and towns to have "local" branches nor to have 
branches in their own counties outside their city limits. 
There is serious question whether in this case the "popu-
lation" or "location" system of classification is a reason-
able one within the meaning of the equal protection 
clause of the United States Constitution and the uni-
form legislation clause of the Utah Constitution 
(An1endment XIV, Section 1, Constitution of the 
(Tnited States; Article I, Section 24, Constitlltion of 
Utah). ''rithout regard to federal decisions, this court 
has struck down laws as containing unreasonable classi-
fications in situations where the relationships between 
the classifications and the legitimate legislative purpo'ses 
were more clearly discernible than they are here. 
This is not to st1ggest that defendants-appellants 
contended in the original argument, or· now, that the 
court should declare the branch banking law unconsti-
tutional. 13ut the possibility that the question will be 
raised in a future case, at a proper time, by the proper 
parties, should be anticipated and the court should not 
adopt a construction of' the statute which might leave 
it no choice but to declare invalid the entire statute 
relating to branch banking. Such a holding might lead 
to a situation in which either all branches are held to 
be illegal, or there is held to be no limitation whatever 
15 
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upon the rights of banks to establish branches in any 
cities and at any times they may choose. 
"When* * * [a statute] is susceptible of two 
interpretations one of which would render it 
unconstitutional and the other bring it within 
constitutional sanctions, the court is bound to 
choose that interpretation which would uphold 
the statute * * *." Norville v. State Tax Com-
mission~ supra~ 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937. 
CONCLUSION 
The opinion as written disregards the meaning of 
7-3-6 as originally enacted in 1933, and provisions of 
68-3-6 U.C.A. 1953 declaring a general legislative policy 
as to the rules to be followed in determining its intentions 
in a specific context. Application of 68-3-6 should be 
enough to justify rehearing and reversal. But if spirit 
is to prevail over letter, if unreasonable or absurd results 
are to be avoided, and if a col).struction is to be adopted 
whjch will render the statute constitutional, the case 
must be reheard, reversed, and remanded to the District 
Court for dismissal with prejudice~ 
Respectfully submitted, 
Peter W. Billings 
Bryce E. Roe 
Fabian & Clendenin 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
State Bank of Provo 
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A. Pratt Kesler 
Attorney General 
H. Wright Volker 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Spencer C. Taylor 
Bank Commissioner 
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